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Abstract 
The minimum age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales remains 10 years: 
something which has attracted criticism globally by policy makers and youth justice 
practitioners. Yet, the Westminster Government refuses to consider changes to 
minimum age of criminal responsibility, despite evidence supporting reform. This 
article, drawing on the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child’s 
consultation to revise General Comment No. 10 (2007) and the activities of UK 
devolved administrations, explores the need for minimum age of criminal 
responsibility reform, considering how a holistic approach focused on diversion and 
the provision of rights respecting appropriate interventions can create positive, even 
transformative outcomes for children. 
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Introduction 
In the 2018 consultation regarding revision of the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child’s General Comment No. 10 (United Nations Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (UNCRC), 2007), it was proposed that minimum age of criminal responsibility 
(MACR) globally should be set no lower than 14 years of age. Such would arguably 
assist in developing an internationally accepted and appropriate global MACR 
standard (UNCRC, 2018). However, at this point in time, MACR has been applied 
asymmetrically by different countries. In continental Europe, for example, there has 
arguably been a continuing liberalisation of approaches towards children, which has 
been reflected in generally higher MACR (Crofts, 2009;   n el and  ruin, 2012). 
Although, it should be noted that the picture is sometimes much more nuanced, with 
a diverse array of treatment pathways and interventions, engagement with which can 
be required of children by the state, even where they are below MACR (Campistol 
and Aebi, 2018). Elsewhere, such generally progressive approaches have been less 
visible (or even invisible), with certain countries continuing to employ an extremely 
low MACR. For instance, in the United States, many states do not employ a MACR, 
while a number of those that have adopted legislation have set their MACR as low as 
7 years of age. In addition, in other jurisdictions, there is evidence that some 
governments have sought to regressively amend existing MACR legislation. 
Recently in the Philippines, a bill was introduced to Congress in January 2019 which 
sought to lower MACR. From these examples alone, it is clear to see that a universal 
approach to MACR has not yet been deployed. 
In England and Wales, it is the case that substantive progress in respect of raising 
MACR has not been forthcoming and such arguably has significant implications 
which flow beyond legal considerations into the very lives and future potential of 
children (Cipriani, 2016). This article, reflecting upon key messages from the 
literature and the work undertaken by devolved administrations in the United 
Kingdom to assist children who may come into conflict with the law, notably in 
Scotland and Wales, considers whether the time is finally right for reform of MACR. 
Yet, and as will become evident, reform is intended to be understood as embracing 
critical areas of activity not merely concerning a legal threshold but relating to the 
provision of rights respecting appropriate interventions for children and diversion. It 
is, in fact, a central contention of this article that it would be a mistake to view any 
reform of MACR, especially in Wales, as an isolated legal artefact or a type of 
sequestered legislative action which is detached from the wider Welsh policy climate. 
Rather, it is contended that conditions are now right for progressive MACR reform to 
occur. However, and poignantly, it is contended that MACR has ‘moved on’ and any 
argument regarding it should be located within a broader debate concerning rights 
respecting appropriate interventions for children and the adoption of diversionary 
approaches, rather than being constricted to considerations of a legal construct. In 
Wales, significantly because there already exists a mesh of child-support and 
diversionary provision which would complement progressive MACR reform, the 
possibility of a unique model, and one that encapsulates the type of model 
envisaged in draft General Comment No. 24 (UNCRC, 2018), appears possible. 
Such would though require a new conceptualisation of what is meant by ‘rights 
respecting appropriate interventions’ (as opposed to earlier and sometimes 
negatively construed types of welfare support), ‘diversion’ and MACR itself, as well 
as a new understanding of how not merely national policy, but devolved or more 
locally determined policy interconnectedness could transform the way that ‘the 
system’ engages with children who come into conflict with the law. 
The Remaining MACR Stalemate: An Unmoveable Westminster Parliament? 
The MACR in England and Wales is 10 years, meaning that a child from that age 
can be arrested and sent to court if they commit a criminal offence. Since the 
beginning of the 1960s, the MACR in England and Wales has, at least nominally, 
remained unchanged (Bateman, 2014; Goldson, 2013). Yet, legislative activity, 
notably the regressive steps taken during the enactment of the Crime and Disorder 
Act (1998), especially Section 34 (which, as will be explored below, abolished the 
rebuttable presumption that a child is doli incapax) in England and Wales has come 
under increasing attack (Arthur, 2012). Particularly at a global level, concerns and 
misgivings around the low MACR in England and Wales have been articulated by the 
United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC, 2007, 2008, 2016), 
academics (Bateman, 2015; Cunneen et al., 2018; Goldson, 2009, 2013; McDiarmid, 
2013) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society groups (for 
consideration of views concerning youth justice in England, see CRAE, 2015). 
Indeed, MACR is no sterile debate, instead being very much on ‘the agenda’ in the 
Westminster Parliament, as evidenced by Lord Dholakia who has repeatedly 
introduced bills in the House of Lords aimed at raising the age threshold, including 
during the current Parliament. In spite of these concerted efforts, the UK government 
has refused to countenance reforming MACR. This has resulted in stalemate and to 
all extents and purposes political deadlock. 
The UK Government’s preference for maintaining the post-1998 approach to MACR 
flows from Ministers conviction that this is appropriate. For example, in 2012, Jeremy 
Wright, the then Minister with oversight of youth justice, in responding to a letter from 
the National Association for Youth Justice (cf. NAYJ, 2012) calling for reform of 
MACR (and signed by 55 experts) made it clear that there would be no change to the 
existing legislation (Bateman, 2015). The rationale of the Government was that no 
change was required, despite protestations to the contrary: Government was 
convinced that the MACR level was appropriate. Subsequently, in its 2014 periodic 
review submission to the Committee on the Rights of the Child , the UK Government 
rejected any re-examination of the MACR threshold in England and Wales, 
maintaining that children and young people 
… aged ten are able to differentiate between bad behaviour and serious wrongdoing. 
(UNCRC, 2015, Paragraph 248) 
An almost identical retort was again reiterated a year later in 2016 (UNCRC, 2016, 
Paragraph 90) when the UK Government responded to a range of challenges (which 
the UK Government needed to address) outlined by the UNCRC in relation to its 
2014 periodic submission (Newson, 2017). More recently, in January 2016 during 
the second reading of Lord  hola ia’s Age of Criminal Responsibility Bill, the 
Conservative Minister of State, Lord Faulks made clear that 
In order to avoid any unnecessary suspense, I should say that the Government have 
no plans to raise the age of criminal responsibility from 10 to 12. (HL Hansard, 29 
January 2016, Column 1574) 
The responses by the UK Government are clear: the policy ‘status quo’, exemplified 
by the provisions of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, is considered to be the way 
that children should, in Ministers views, be treated by the criminal justice system. 
The thrust of governmental opinion indicates that it is accepted that those aged 10 
and above, irrespective of what has been found in research and practice (Cipriani, 
2016) are indeed capable of understanding the severity and wrongful nature of their 
actions. While arguably dogmatic, government is at least consistent in this respect 
and, despite efforts by Parliamentarians and experts to argue to the contrary, there is 
no appetite by the UK Government to revisit MACR. The current MACR settlement in 
England and Wales accordingly stands and must be expected to do so for the near 
future. 
The Rationale for Reconfiguring MACR in England and Wales 
Offsetting and directly challenging the UK Government’s reluctance to consider any 
reconfiguration of MACR in England and Wales has been a growing and compelling 
evidence base for raising the threshold above 10 years of age. This evidence base 
has been underpinned by a series of issues which, when synthesised, seemingly 
offer a coherent and comprehensive case for legislative, policy and justice-practice 
reform. Among these issues, the following are key: 
The relationship between MACR and diversion 
Locally driven diversionary policy has become widespread, driven by Youth 
Offending Teams and the Youth Justice Board (Kelly and Armitage, 2015).[AQ1] 
Such is demonstrable with reference to the government’s own data. For example, in 
England and Wales the most visible recent statistical trend to emerge in relation to 
children in conflict with the law has been the stark reduction in numbers of first-time 
entrants (FTEs). FTEs as a measure of system ‘success’ is, in the view of 
government important, being one of two Key Performance Indicators adopted by 
central government in Westminster. Diversion is something that the criminal justice 
system, in the context of FTEs deems critical and, has arguably been an operational 
focus, with statistics presented at Figure 1 demonstrating that between the years 
ending March 2008 to 2018, reductions in FTEs have totalled 86 per cent. 
 
Figure 1. Number of first-time entrants in England and Wales for the year ending 
March 2008 to March 2018. 
Source: Youth Justice Board / Ministry of Justice (2019). 
Although some tensions and complexities exists when the true extent of diversion’s 
impact upon youth crime is considered, it can nevertheless be said that at the same 
time as there has been a purposeful growth of national- and local-level youth 
diversion schemes (cf. Haines et al., 2013; Home Office, 2012; Rix et al., 2011; 
Soppitt and Irving, 2014) in England and Wales, so also have FTE numbers fallen. 
The promotion of diversion schemes (something that Parliament has encouraged via 
the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act, 2012) has created, in 
the contexts of system contact and FTEs, positive impacts, that is, less children are 
becoming embroiled within the youth justice system (Haines and Charles, 2010). 
Although, as emphasised, the use of diversion clearly forms an important and 
effective tool for engaging with children, it is routinely employed once a child has 
committed an offence and made contact with the criminal justice system. In this 
sense, it is a positive tool which is utilised post-system contact (when harm may 
already have been caused to a child, Ministry of Justice, 2016). However, 
progressive reform of MACR, it is suggested, would mean that more could be done 
to enable children to avoid system contact and the negative implications it possesses 
(McAra and McVie, 2007). For example, raising the MACR would mean that a cohort 
of children (and also their families) could potentially benefit from a renewed 
emphasis on primary prevention initiatives and non-stigmatising community-based 
supports, in the process, avoiding the potential criminogenic risks that accompany 
exposure to the post-offence diversionary arena. As Goldson (2013) suggests,[AQ2] 
The most effective diversionary strategy, of course, is literally to remove children 
from the reach of the youth justice system altogether, by significantly raising the 
minimum age of criminal responsibility. (p. 122) 
At its most basic level, reform of MACR, specifically raising it, would mean that 
certain age groups of children could benefit from the subsequent vacuum created: a 
vacuum which could be filled with non-stigmatising forms of support and initiatives 
which would act to reduce the likelihood of a child penetrating deeper into the formal 
youth justice system (McAra and McVie, 2018). Fundamentally, this would help 
mitigate against children experiencing what Bateman (2012) has acknowledged to 
be adverse experiences, including labelling and stigma and potentially the 
impairment of future life chances (House of Commons Justice Committee, 2017). 
The detrimental impact of labelling (Becker, 1963) is well evidenced as a 
criminogenic factor and one which negatively wor s to impair a child’s chances of 
successfully reintegrating back into society. 
The focus here on system contact, labelling and negative consequences for children 
is not, however, simply a philosophical point. In 2019, the UK Supreme Court 
specifically recognised the reality in particular of the long-term life chance 
implications of system contact when it determined R (on the application of P, G and 
W) (Respondents) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and another 
(Appellants), 2019. While the case in question did not seek to determine the law 
regarding MACR, its immediate implications and relationship are, reflecting upon the 
Court’s judgement, clear. For the highest Court in the United Kingdom to see the 
reality of system contact and its corrosive effects upon children is heartening. Yet, 
despite this, Ministers have not adopted a position which mirrors that of the Court, 
despite evidence, both in the United Kingdom and more widely, that suggests such a 
shift in policy could create positive impacts. 
Reforming the reform: Using progressive changes to MACR to undo New 
Labour’s abolition of doli incapax 
Congruent with New Labour’s broader reforms of the youth justice system, Section 
34 of the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) abolished the presumption of doli incapax 
for children in England and Wales. Prior to 1998, children aged 10 until turning 14 
years of age by virtue of being doli incapax were viewed as incapable of criminal 
intent. Doli incapax granted children a partial safeguard, with those aged between 10 
and 14 years being considered as incapable of forming criminal intent. In cases 
where those prosecuting wished to claim that children indeed understood what they 
were doing, they had to establish, before the Court that that a child understood that 
what they were doing was a serious wrong as opposed to a stunt or prank turned 
bad (Fitz-Gibbon, 2016). In this context, doli incapax possessed important 
implications for the protection of children and its removal ‘made childhood irrelevant 
to criminalisation’ (Bandalli, 1998: 121). New Labour’s approach to doli incapax 
effectively lowered MACR for young children and arguably enabled a net-widening 
effect (see Fitz-Gibbon, 2016) which poignantly contradicts empirical evidence that 
contact with the formal youth justice system is counterproductive and may even 
promote future recidivism (McAra and McVie, 2007). For example, Bateman (2012) 
has highlighted the quantifiable detrimental impact of the decision to abolish doli 
incapax, stating that 
In 1999 the number of ten to fourteen-year-olds given cautions or convictions for 
indictable offences was 29% higher than it had been in the year prior to 
implementation. (p. 5) 
There was a subtle irony to New Labour’s position:  arliament wished to reform 
youth justice and create appropriate avenues for children coming into contact with 
the system, not least to avoid over-contact and future negative effects, but 
government policy created the reverse (Wells, 2007). The consequence of New 
Labour’s approach was that, as of 1998, the limited protection afforded by doli 
incapax to children in conflict with the law was removed, effectively increasing the 
legal vulnerability of 10- to 14-year-olds in England and Wales. Essentially, the 
removal of doli incapax enabled a depression of the MACR threshold to encompass 
those as young as 10 (Bateman, 2012). This legal construct, far from promoting 
justice and holding to account those who have committed crime, has created net-
widening, capturing often vulnerable individuals who may not understand what they 
have done (see Delmage, 2013; Elliott, 2011; Rocque, 2015) and subjecting them to 
the full force of the criminal law. When the principal purpose of the youth justice 
system, articulated by New Labour in Section 37 of the Crime and Disorder Act 
(1998), that is, to prevent crime, is considered, government policy seems more likely 
to be fissiparous rather than unifying. While there are few calls for the restoration of 
doli incapax, MACR reform could help to rectify this particular legislative action and 
its negative consequences. 
Reforming the MACR to respect maturation and developmental evidence 
The importance of age (and capacity) in youth justice proceedings has increasingly 
been acknowledged by those who examine justice-related narratives (see, for 
example, McDiarmid, 2013; UK Parliament and Parliamentary Office of Science & 
Technology, 2018) and underline the significance of child-developmental processes 
in relation to offending behaviour. Commenting specifically on the relationship 
between physical and mental capacity and MACR, Wishart (2018) helpfully suggests 
that 
Neuroscience tells us adolescents lac  capacity … It seems more plausible, if there 
were to be an increase, that the minimum age of criminal responsibility is raised 
higher than 12 years to reflect the stages of developmental maturity obtained. (p. 
319) 
Concurring with such sentiments, the practice of holding children from the age of 10 
to account for their actions has been viewed by some as increasingly questionable. 
As Bateman (2012) has noted, that children’s ‘capacity’ differs from adults is 
recognised in other areas of social life. For example, a young person can only begin 
driving aged 17 (or 16 if claiming mobility benefit); can only purchase alcohol aged 
18; or apply for a mortgage for a house at 18. Yet, and in policy terms, paradoxically 
they can be exposed to the full force of the criminal justice system as young as 10 
years old. 
In critically reflecting on this point, it is necessary to highlight that a tension does 
exist in pursuing MACR reform based exclusively on arguments around children’s 
age and evolving capacities. A more robust human rights argument can be made 
(see James and Prout, 1998, Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA, 1986, Article 
12, Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)) which focuses on the reality that 
children are the inviolable holders of rights. Such is not a fanciful concept, but has 
implications for MACR, notably, as suggested by Goldson (2013) that[AQ3] 
irrespective of the vexed question of capacity − there are strong grounds for raising 
the minimum age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales if the ‘goals’ of the 
youth justice system are taken to include: complying with the provisions of the 
international human rights standards that have been formally ratified by the UK 
government; modelling a system of justice that is broadly compatible with practice 
elsewhere in Europe … minimizing social harm and obtaining the best outcomes for 
children in conflict with the law … (p. 116) 
Reflecting on Goldson’s (2013) statement, it is significant that in relation to 
‘minimizing social harm’ and ‘obtaining the best outcomes for children in conflict with 
the law’, 47 children aged between 10 to 14 years of age were situated in the youth 
secure estate as of March 2018 (Ministry of Justice, 2019). Should such a reality be 
presented in discussions concerning MACR? Arguably this is important, since 
evidence exists to highlight the serious and disturbing challenges facing those who 
may enter the youth secure estate , such as incidents of self-harm and exposure to 
violence. Proven assaults in secure estate settings were, for instance, during the 
year ending March 2018, the highest recorded for the past 5 years (Youth Justice 
Board / Ministry of Justice, 2019, c.f. HMCIP, 2017).[AQ4] Longer term, system 
contact and continuing system immersion (potentially as a consequence of the 
consolidation of criminogenic behaviour, toxic mix and negative impacts on a child’s 
character) also remain, particularly when those as young as 10 could possibly be 
embroiled in such a circumstance (Cunneen et al., 2018). How such can be made to 
align with human rights discourse is difficult to envisage (Farmer, 2011). 
The isolation of England and Wales’ position: Misalignment with other 
countries 
As a result of continuing UK Government policy, it is clear that (see Table 1) MACR 
in England and Wales has been largely ‘out of sync’ with a majority of other 
European countries and is among the lowest in Europe (Bateman, 2012; Goldson, 
2013; Hazel, 2008; Weijers, 2016). 
Table 1. 
The ages of criminal responsibility in European Union member states. 
Member state 
Age 
(MACR) 
Member state Age (MACR) 
Austria 14 Italy 14 
Belgium 12 Latvia 14 
Bulgaria 14 Lithuania 16 
Croatia 14 Luxembourg 16 
Rep of 
Cyprus 
14 Malta 14 
Czech Rep 15 Netherlands 12 
Denmark 15 Poland 15 
Estonia 14 Portugal 16 
Finland 15 Romania 14 
France 13 Slovakia 14 
Germany 14 Slovenia 14 
Greece 14 Spain 14 
Hungary 14 Sweden 15 
Ireland 12 
United 
Kingdom 
10 (England, Wales and Northern 
Ireland) 
8 Scotland 
Source: Scottish Parliament (2018). 
MACR: minimum age of criminal responsibility. 
Should the example of other jurisdictions matter? Well, in international terms, the 
isolation of the United Kingdom is significant, especially in the light of the UK 
claiming to be a country that promotes human rights and pivotal legal protections 
such as due process (Field, 2017). The UNCRC has, as a global entity, repeatedly 
reproved the UK government for its almost dogmatic position which is set against re-
considering the case for raising its MACR threshold. For example, in 2008 in its 
‘Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’ the 
UNCRC recommended in Paragraph 78 that 
… the State party … Raise the minimum age of criminal responsibility in accordance 
with the Committee’s general comment No. 10, and notably its paragraphs 32 and 
33. (UNCRC, 2008, Paragraph 78) 
This message was subsequently reiterated 8 years later (UNCRC, 2016) and 
domestically dissatisfaction has been expressed by Children’s Commissioners for 
both England and Wales (UK Children’s Commissioners, 2008) and also by youth 
justice and child rights NGOs (SCYJ, 2017). 
Significantly, the schism between the UK Government’s position on the MACR in 
England and Wales and international practice (and policy direction) has been further 
compounded by the intention of the UNCRC to develop General Comment No. 24. 
Paragraph 33 of the proposed General Comment No. 24 (UNCRC, 2018) seeks to 
revise General Comment No. 10 and explicitly encourage State parties to raise their 
MACR to at least 14 years of age. If adopted, this would send a powerful global 
message. 
It is noteworthy that efforts at the international level, via the UNCRC, have been 
evolving for some time (see UNCRC, 2007) and are not something which have 
recently become manifest. In the case of the United Kingdom, despite it being a 
signatory to the CRC, it stubbornly resists key aspects of guidance and advice 
which, for some time have existed globally. For example, in the 2007 version of 
General Comment No. 10, where the UNCRC advocated that a comprehensive 
approach to juvenile justice policy should be adopted by States (especially in relation 
to the implementation of Article 2, 3, 6, 12, 37 and 40), with this being augmented by 
supportive provisions to help children who are in conflict with the law. Particularly 
critical among these provisions are the statements Paragraphs 32 and 33 of the 
2007 General Comment No. 10. Some 12 years ago, the UNCRC recommended that 
… a minimum age of criminal responsibility below the age of 12 years is considered 
by the Committee not to be internationally acceptable. States parties are encouraged 
to increase their lower MACR to the age of 12 years as the absolute minimum age 
and to continue to increase it to a higher age level. (UNCRC, 2007, Paragraph 32) 
Furthermore, the Committee exhorted States, 
… not to lower their MACR to the age of 12. A higher MACR, for instance 14 or 16 
years of age, contribute to a juvenile justice system which, in accordance with Article 
40 (3) (b) of CRC, deals with children in conflict with the law, without resorting to 
judicial proceeding, providing that the child’s human rights and legal safeguards are 
fully respected. (UNCRC, 2007, Paragraph 33) 
Despite this clear guidance and the reality that it has influenced change in policy and 
legislation concerning MACR (for instance, Council of Europe, 2010), the UK 
government remains intransigent. Such unwillingness to change MACR has been 
maintained even in the face of a rebuke by the UNCRC in 2016 when in its 
concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of the United Kingdom’s 
compliance with the Convention it said: 
With reference to its general comment no. 10 (2007) on children’s rights in juvenile 
justice, the Committee recommends that State party to bring its juvenile justice 
system … fully into line with the Convention and other standards. In particular, the 
Committee recommends that the State party: 
(a)Raise the minimum age of criminal responsibility in accordance with acceptable 
international standards. (UNCRC, 2016, Paragraph 79) 
The provisions of General Comment No. 10 (UNCRC, 2007) will, if approved, be 
amplified in the anticipated, revised General Comment, placing yet greater pressure 
on the United Kingdom to move its approach to youth justice in line with international 
standards. Such inevitably reveals and highlights the differences between much of 
Europe and other developed countries (Bateman, 2012) and the United Kingdom 
which maintains, especially in England and Wales, a distinct status quo which 
regrettably may be damaging children, sitting quite uncomfortably with international 
standards (Kilkelly, 2008; Smith, 2014). 
Dissolving Dogma: Movement on MACR in Scotland – The Age of Criminal 
Responsibility (Scotland) Bill 
While criticism of the United Kingdom, as a whole, is being voiced internationally, it is 
incorrect to type-cast all UK constituent nations as supporting a restrictive 
standpoint. In Scotland, where since 1998, fully devolved powers on justice have 
been exercised by Scottish Ministers, discussions have been on-going regarding 
how Scots Law can be reformed. Section 14 of the Children and Young Persons 
(Scotland) Act, 1932 set the Scottish MACR at 8 years old. Resultantly, Scotland has 
one of the lowest MACR’s in Europe (see Table 1), if not globally (Sutherland, 2016). 
Yet, in a divergent manner to England and Wales, the Scottish Government and 
Scottish Parliament have focused upon and agreed to amend MACR in Scotland. 
Following criticism from the UNCRC (2007) concerning Scotland’s low MACR, the 
Scottish Government in its 2012 ‘ o the Right Thing: children’s rights progress 
report’ stated that it would give fresh consideration to raising MACR. Accordingly, in 
2015, the Scottish Government established an Advisory Group on the Minimum Age 
of Criminal Responsibility to investigate raising MACR to 12 years old. The Advisory 
Group consisted of professionals, including those working with children, child victims, 
as well as the Police, Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service. Principally, their 
mandate was to examine four areas, encompassing[AQ5] 
… the management of ris  in relation to children’s harmful behaviour; changes that 
may be required to the Children’s Hearings System;  olice powers and issues in 
relation to Disclosure certificates and the weeding and retention of non-conviction 
information. (Scottish Government, 2016a: 3) 
In March 2016, the Advisory Group made clear that Scotland’s relationship to 
children was changing and what would previously have been ‘unthin able’ was no 
longer the case. In fact, the Advisory Group 
… concluded that the age of criminal responsibility in Scotland can and should be 
raised to 12 years old, and that any change should happen at the earliest 
opportunity. (Scottish Government, 2016a: 48) 
These recommendations were quickly followed by a public consultation. Significantly, 
ninety-five per cent of respondents believed that the MACR threshold should be 
increased to 12 years or older. This momentum led in March 2018 to the introduction 
of the ‘Age of Criminal Responsibility (Scotland) Bill’ in the Scottish  arliament to 
grant legal effect to the raising of MACR to 12 years of age ( art 1, lines 10-13). In 
May 2019, MSPs unanimously voted to change MACR legislation from 8 years of 
age to 12 years of age. While the move to increase Scotland’s MACR is 
encouraging, at 12 years of age it still will not meet the minimum requirements of the 
proposed UN draft General Comment No. 24 (see Paragraph 33). 
As such, it might be contended that while positive, Scotland needs to do more 
(McVie, 2018). Nonetheless, it is the case that Scotland as a nation post-devolution 
has been able to push back against what is considered a more regressive position, 
authored by Westminster.  erhaps tellingly, Scotland’s journey has been 
underpinned by a strong evidence base, which has helped catalyse change. At an 
international level, the recommendations of the UNCRC have of course been 
significant, but domestically longitudinal research undertaken by McAra and McVie 
(2007) has also been important, as have the views of professionals and children 
themselves (Scottish Government, 2016a, 2016b). These views all attest to the 
importance of recognising the fundamentally crucial importance of not criminalising 
children unnecessarily, of acknowledging key arguments such as those relating to 
capacity and age and the desirability of engaging with a more sophisticated 
approach to tackling criminogenic behaviour by children through social, welfare and 
diversion-focused services. 
Scotland, in defying the orthodoxy of Westminster, offers hope to other UK 
constituent nations, and it is the case that even with limited devolved powers, much 
can arguably be done to articulate policy and service frameworks that encourage not 
merely MACR reform, but new ways of comprehending the manner in which children 
who come into conflict with the law should be treated. Accordingly, it is relevant then 
to consider the blurred yet exciting position of Wales and how its distinctively 
‘dragonised’ (Haines, 2009) post-devolution commitment to promoting the rights, 
universal entitlements and best interests of its children (including those in conflict 
with the law) can overcome the deficiencies of current UK law and synergise 
discussion about MACR. 
Welsh Devolution: Deploying Mechanisms for MACR Reform? 
Although Scotland has fully devolved justice powers and has been able to enact 
legislation to amend MACR, it is not the case that only Scotland, within the United 
Kingdom, has made progress in adopting different approaches to protect children 
from the potentially negative effects of criminal justice system exposure. Wales has a 
unique devolution settlement and has the capacity to influence justice policy. Alas, 
while it is not possible here to consider the complex journey that the Welsh nation 
has travelled since 1998, it does need to be said that criminal justice as a strict field 
of legislative competence is currently a non-devolved matter and remains the 
legislative responsibility of Westminster. On the issue of legal jurisdiction and 
capacity, following Carwyn Jones’ decision in 2017, a ‘Commission on Justice in 
Wales’ was convened to review the wor ings of the justice system within the country. 
The Commission, chaired by Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (a former Lord Chief Justice 
for England and Wales), has been set a remit that includes examining criminal 
justice and policing; civil, commercial, family and administrative justice; access to 
justice; legal education and training; the legal professions and economy; and the 
legal jurisdiction. Specifically, the ‘terms of reference’ of the Commission of Justice in 
Wales’ are to 
… review the operation of the justice system in Wales and set a long term vision for 
its future, with a view to: 
● promoting better outcomes in terms of access to justice, reducing crime and 
promoting rehabilitation; 
● ensuring that the jurisdictional arrangements and legal education address and 
reflect the role of justice in the governance and prosperity of Wales as well as 
distinct issues that arise in Wales; 
● promoting the strength and sustainability of the Welsh legal services sector and 
maximising its contribution to the prosperity of Wales. 
 (Welsh Government, Terms of Reference, 2018) 
It is anticipated that the ‘Justice Commission in Wales’ will publish its report findings 
and recommendations sometime during late 2019. Dependent on its findings and 
recommendations, it may be that youth justice (as well as other criminal justice and 
legal apparatus) are devolved to Wales. Although the devolution of youth justice in 
particular has previously been explored (Morgan, 2009), it is suggested that if this 
transpires it may herald a unique opportunity for progressive reform of the MACR in 
Wales, if this matter is considered in a traditional manner, that is, amendment of 
criminal law. In that context, the Welsh Assembly could, if there were further 
devolution of powers, raise MACR, cementing on-going positive work with children 
and becoming a ‘beacon for positive youth justice reform’ (Morgan, 2009: 90). 
The potential for this ‘… positive youth justice reform’ (Morgan, 2009) has 
accelerated over time. Following devolution to Wales in 1998, the Assembly began 
its life by adopting a distinctively rights-focused policy approach to children in Wales. 
Operating as a robust cornerstone for this child-centric vision has been the CRC, 
and particularly Article 12, which recognises children’s inviolable rights to participate 
in decision ma ing. The National Assembly for Wales’ early endorsement of the 
provisions of the UNCRC are well documented and influence key areas of devolved 
authority such as local government and health and well-being (Welsh Government, 
2015, 2004, Williams, 2013). Yet, what the Welsh devolved administration sought to 
do was not develop some type of legal rhetoric: rather, using its powers, the 
Assembly and Assembly Government began a process of embedding rights in 
services and effecting the progressive liberalisation of universal services for children. 
For example, in 2002, secondary legislation was enacted to develop ‘Extending 
Entitlement’ (National Assembly Policy Unit, 2002) which outlined ‘ten universal 
entitlements’ for children and young people aged between 11 and 25 years, which 
were intended as far as possible, to be free at point of use, universal and 
unconditional. Since 2002, Extending Entitlement has been consolidated by the 
Children and Families (Wales) Measure (National Assembly for Wales, 2010) and 
the Rights of Children and Young Persons (Wales) Measure (National Assembly for 
Wales, 2011) which uniquely placed a child rights ‘due regard’ duty on Ministers, 
along with the creation of the United Kingdom’s first Children’s Commissioner. 
Consistently, and using its social welfare, education, local government and 
community safety powers, the devolved administration in Wales has evidenced a 
commitment to the ‘rights and entitlements’ of children, especially as stated in the 
CRC (see Social Service and Well-Being (Wales) Act, 2014). This has spilled over 
into youth justice policy and practice (which, although not devolved, have proved 
fertile grounds for Welsh approaches). Despite legislative power in the field of youth 
justice not being devolved to Wales, the Assembly’s financial and related-service 
powers have allowed it leverage. Specifically, a number of tailored policy strategies 
have been developed in partnership with the Youth Justice Board, including the All 
Wales Youth Offending Strategy (Welsh Assembly Government / Youth Justice 
Board, 2004) and Children and Young People First (Welsh Assembly Government / 
Youth Justice Board, 2014): both of which place a  ey ‘dragonised’ (Haines, 2009) 
emphasis on treating children as ‘children first, offenders second’ (Haines and Case, 
2015) – something which, on the grounds of capacity and maturity at least, could be 
harnessed to support reform within youth justice. Certainly, given Wales’ ethos on 
children, progressive reform of the MACR in Wales would not run in opposition to its 
policy and legislative vision to date, but rather would consolidate, reinforce and 
harmonise with Wales’ distinctive, positive and progressive rights-based approach to 
children and young people that has evolved post-devolution. 
Again though, and this matters, discussion in Wales concerning MACR has not 
simply focused on the potentially blunt tool of a legal threshold. When reflection on 
the direction of travel which is evident in Wales is undertaken, it is discernible that 
something more nuanced is happening, which has consequences for debate 
regarding MACR. Significantly, and flowing from an express use of devolved power, 
a distinctive and more sophisticated rights respecting appropriate interventions 
approach centred on notions of intervening where necessary and ‘supporting’, 
‘empowering’ and ‘entitling’ children has become manifest (Welsh Assembly 
Government / Youth Justice Board, 2004; Welsh Government, 2014). For example, 
within the Children and Families (Wales) Measure (National Assembly for Wales, 
2010) emphases on family support and anti-poverty are woven into a broader 
legislative fabric that envisages the generation of positive futures for children. In the 
Prevention of Offending by Young People White Paper issued by the Welsh 
Government in 2014, it was also said that 
A criminal record is the biggest obstacle between a young person and the life they 
want to lead. We have the opportunity to help remove this obstacle. (Welsh 
Government, 2014: 1) 
Such resonates in the Well-Being of Future Generations (Wales) Act (2015), the due 
regard duty created via the Rights of Children and Young Persons (Wales) Measure 
(National Assembly for Wales, 2011) and the ambitious, whole-child approach being 
incorporated into the new Welsh Curriculum, which will become operational in 2022 
(Welsh Government, 2019a).[AQ6] 
Rights Respecting and Appropriate Interventions: Raising MACR, Yet Ensuring 
that those Children Who Need Assistance Are Not Abandoned by the State? 
The term ‘rights respecting and appropriate intervention’ has been used in this 
article, and in the context of the potential for MACR reform in Wales, it is important. It 
is critical that, in the context of State intervention provision for children, what is being 
described concerning Wales’ current efforts should be distinguished from ‘welfare’ 
(as previously understood by many). There will undoubtedly be some who recoil from 
the term ‘welfare’, associating it with negative connotations from the past (Thorpe et 
al., 1980). However, and arguably adopting the positive principles underpinning what 
was called welfare, and its intention to support children (which is difficult to refute), 
what is now happening in Wales is no mere treatment model, or an excuse for State 
intervention. Rather, flowing from CRC respecting and embedding legislation (for 
example, as stated above, the Rights of Children and Young Persons (Wales) 
Measure, National Assembly for Wales, 2011) and policy, allied with the child-
focused social policy and service-related powers of the Welsh Government which 
inter-link and inform youth justice matters in Wales (Drakeford, 2010) appropriate 
interventions are becoming mainstreamed.[AQ7] The emergence of rights respecting 
appropriate interventions are not about dependency, nor a ‘nanny state’, but rather a 
recognition that children need (and, as the CRC would suggest, deserve) 
interventions to support them as they face personal, social and familial issues, 
especially in an age where public services are retreating. Appropriate interventions 
which recognise the rights of the child focus on the activities of a compassionate 
state which values quality preventive and support services, that sees social problems 
and acknowledges the need for intervention to attain the original goal of the Crime 
and  isorder Act (1998) to ‘… prevent offending by children and young persons’ 
(Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, Section 37). Interventions in this context are not 
stifling nor suffocating. Instead, the rights respecting appropriate interventions are 
concerned with ensuring a continuum of support for children: but support which 
meets their needs rather than being arbitrarily enforced by the State. The aim in this 
sense is not to interfere with a child’s rights, but to respect them, and to help a child 
move away from those things which are negatively affecting them, so that they can 
fully achieve their developmental, economic and civic potential (cf. Articles 6, 12, 28, 
40, CRC, 1989). 
Why is this relevant in the context of MACR? This is relevant because the logical 
conclusion of the direction of devolved Welsh policy is a multi-tiered prevention 
approach, that is embedded not in justice services, but in school-based practice, 
strong universal services offered by local government, a partnership approach to 
Youth Justice Board and Welsh Government strategy and an underpinning 
legislative framework that positively emphasises rights, well-being and future 
opportunities (cf. Ball, 2014; Byrne and Lundy, 2015; Tisdall, 2015). In fact, the youth 
justice blue print adopted by the National Assembly of Wales in 2019 exemplifies 
and sets within a single strategic framework all of these things (Welsh Government, 
2019b). To an extent, it may be argued that over the last two decades this type of 
approach has served to mitigate an England and Wales MACR and obviate some of 
its deleterious impacts. But it should not be argued that this ‘stic ing plaster’ is an 
ultimate solution: it is treating a symptom within what can be described as a 
somewhat hostile youth justice environment. Looking forward, what is being 
suggested is that a rights respecting appropriate intervention ethos can be utilised to 
underpin progressive amendment of the MACR in Wales, which may be on the 
horizon. For example, if the MACR was raised to 14 years of age in Wales (in line 
with UN recommendations), it is the case that strong multi-agency, support-
orientated patterns of wor ing are already well established and notions of ‘rights’, 
‘opportunities’ and ‘entitlements’ for children are already ingrained in everyday youth 
practice. There is no doubt that Welsh MACR reform would possess certain practical 
challenges (particularly resource wise), but ultimately, it is contended that the 
existing sphere of support provision could be extended and moulded to meet the 
demands of engaging with children not simply at preventive and diversionary stage, 
but also post serious offending behaviour. This type of approach is envisaged within 
draft General Comment No. 24 (see Paragraphs 19 and 23-27). 
Significantly, within existing Welsh practice, innovative youth justice blueprints 
already exist, which embody and display many of the ‘practice traits’ (e.g. multi-
agency working, a rights focus, an emphasis on support, and a desire to see children 
not unduly criminalised but rehabilitated back into society) that will need to be 
amplified in the event of MACR reform. Welsh Bureaux, for instance, while part of 
the reserved legislative regime in Wales, but influenced strongly by the devolved 
administration and local government (a devolved responsibility), have been at the 
forefront of this approach for a decade and have been commended for the way in 
which they offer an innovative, holistic (providing both diversion and support) and 
rights-focused form of post-offence, but pre-court youth diversion for children aged 
between 10 and 17 years old (see Brown, 2018; Haines and Case, 2015; Haines and 
Charles, 2010, for an overview of its workings). Within these Bureaux, rights-focused 
and appropriate interventions principles have underpinned successful practice which 
has identified and enabled the resolution of challenges facing children, which often 
have led to types of behaviour resulting in system challenge. It is though, through a 
positive lens, rather than an imposition of ‘treatment’ that support has been applied: 
as data suggest, this has led to positive results which arguably, criminalisation of 
children or the negative effects of locking them into sometimes inappropriate 
treatment models would not have achieved (see Haines et al., 2013; Lee and 
Villagrana, 2015). This demonstrable reality presents the potential for transformative 
change and policy opportunity. 
Conclusion: Removing the Roadblock and Making the MACR Work for 
Children? 
MACR in England and Wales is characterised by the lack of political impetus, despite 
practice and evidence at national and international levels to the contrary, to instigate 
progressive reform. A political impasse has occurred in spite of pressure from a 
variety of different quarters, including the UNCRC, NGOs, youth justice academics 
and politicians. Key arguments for progressive reform of the MACR are now globally 
being discussed, via the UNCRC’s efforts to revise General Comment No. 10. 
Despite the intransigence of the Westminster Parliament, within the United Kingdom 
efforts to reform MACR are being undertaken, notably via the Age of Criminal 
Responsibility (Scotland) Bill), although in the context of international debate, such 
reform appears to be modest. While MACR remains an important aspect of what is 
commonly referred to as the ‘youth justice system’, it may be contended that the 
MACR debate has moved on from being simply about a legal tool. Due in part to the 
renewal of emphasis on prevention and state services inspired by implementation of 
the Crime and Disorder Act (1998), within the United Kingdom at least, although this 
is referenced at UN level too, debate concerning the ways in which more holistic 
approaches to achieving less system contact and the promotion of rights respecting 
appropriate interventions are becoming more visible. It is in this contextual reality 
that the situation of Wales, as an area of the United Kingdom with a defined set of 
devolved powers, offers some hope and a solution to achieving a satisfactory 
approach to MACR (and the example of Wales could apply elsewhere). In Wales, 
through the creation of an appropriate, intervention net which is predicated on 
children’s rights, state services and support and a positive vision of each child’s 
future, the scene may be being set for a more holistic type of MACR reform. Were, 
for instance, MACR to be raised to 14, there would not be a vacuum of support: 
existing legislative and policy provision would ensure that children were not 
abandoned at a time when they might be vulnerable. Rather, this type of forward-
looking and progressive youth support model could help children, addressing 
underlying health, social care or educational issues (through non-justice agencies 
such as schools and local authorities) and use the new space that MACR reform 
would generate to undo problems. Clearly, this type of approach has profound 
implications for the criminal justice system. While such an approach might be 
antithetical to Westminster politicians, it may be revelatory and transformative for 
children who might otherwise become entrapped by a MACR threshold which 
appears not to comprehend issues of capacity, maturity and the need for support 
services, not system contact. Surely, holistic reform of this type is worth considering 
and pursuing. 
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